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FAILED

McGinley Dynamic (10, k=0.6)

An ordinary moving average treats every departure of price the same way. Making the step depend on the distance between price and the line itself lets the average adjust on its own to how far the market has strayed from it — closing the gap quickly when it has fallen behind, and resisting when price is merely oscillating around it.

Measured in forexEUR/USD and GBP/USD · daily bars built from 15m · 1 pip spread (~0.009% per round trip) · no survivorship bias

Net per trade
−0.00%
after fees
The fee is charged on both legs: every trade pays to open and pays to close.
Died at
costs
the 0.01% fee eats the whole edge
Worst drawdown
−0%
2,138 days underwater
How far the account fell below its own best previous moment.
Timeframe
1 day
The time grid this was measured on. The same technique on a coarser or finer grid is a different measurement, and can earn a different verdict.
  • invariance
  • costs
  • placebo
  • benchmark
  • out of sample
  • multiple testing
Equity curve
Risking 1.0% per trade, marked to market every day — not only when a trade closes. The line at 1.0 is the capital it started with.

At its worst the account was worth 0% less than its own best previous moment, and it spent 2,138 days below that peak.

The technique against chance
Same number of trades, same holding time, same assets — only the dates were drawn at random.
0%barthe technique−0.00%random dates−0.01%
The average trade and the typical one
The mean sits above the median: the lottery signature — the typical trade loses and a rare handful pays for everything.
0%mean+0.00%median−0.21%

What was measured

We coded the rule exactly as it is described and let it trade on its own from 2020-01-01 to 2026-06-26. It found trades in 2 coins, 710 in total. Each one enters and exits at the price that existed on that day — the program never sees what comes next, which is the most common mistake people make testing strategies at home. Wherever the description was ambiguous we took the reading least favourable to the technique; whatever was left open is stated in the hypothesis, at the foot of this page.

How many of those trades actually count

Only 270 of the 710. Cryptocurrencies rise and fall almost in unison, so the same rule fires on dozens of coins on the same day — and that is one bet repeated, not dozens of different bets. Counting them all separately is the trick that makes a bad test look impressive.

What it paid, before any deductions

+0.00% per trade. This is the number the technique claims, and the only one on this page that has not yet been through a single control.

Why it did not pass — it died here · the broker's fee

We subtract the fee the broker charges to open and to close each trade — every trade pays on both legs. The edge existed on paper and vanished at that subtraction. A result that only survives without the fee does not survive in the real world.

What would have happened to the money

Risking 1.0% of capital per trade — the most widely taught rule — across the whole period: The capital would have ended at 1.00× what it started with. At its worst the account was worth 0% less than its own best previous moment, and it spent 2,138 days below that peak. In none of the 12 paths tested did it fall to less than half of what it started with.

What this result does NOT say

For an edge to be assertable here it would have to reach 0.65% per trade — that is the size that survives this archive's multiple-testing correction, and it rises as the archive grows. So FAILED means “we found nothing above that size”, and never “it cannot possibly work”. The instrument is far more sensitive than that: on synthetic data, with a clean effect, it separates from 0.09% upwards. The distance between the two numbers is the price of a real market and the price of publishing many claims. The difference matters, and it is the rule of this house: the card confronts the claim, never the person who made it.
What this card does not measure
Every verdict holds for the conditions it was measured under. These are this card's — and outside them the result does not apply.
One market, one universe
Measured on 2 spot currency pairs. It says nothing about futures, equities or indices, nor about how the same technique behaves in another market.
One window of time, not every window
The measured period runs from 2020-01-01 to 2026-06-26. A market moves through regimes, and a technique can work in one and fail in another — the card measures the regimes that fit inside this window, not the ones still to come.
One cost structure
The cost charged is a 1.0 pip spread, crossed once. Anyone paying more than that gets a worse result, and anyone paying less gets a better one — the verdict holds for this fee.
One exit rule
The trade was closed by: the technique itself (held until the opposite signal). The same entry measured with a different exit is a different strategy, and can earn a different verdict — it happens in this archive.
The number of trades is not the sample size
There are 710 trades, but only 270 independent market episodes: trades that overlap in time are not independent observations, and counting them as if they were inflates any result. It is the smaller number that governs the arithmetic. With 270 episodes, what the data supports is a range from -0.10% to +0.10% per trade — the published average is the centre of it, not the exact measurement.
Daily bars
Measured at the daily close. Nothing here measures what happens inside the day, and an intraday technique is not auditable with this data.

Numbers and reproducibility

The six controls

controlstatustthresholdepisodes
invariancepassed
costsfailed-0.081.97270
placeboinconclusive0.071.97270
benchmarkfailed
out of sampleinconclusive
multiple testinginconclusive
  • invariance710 signals across 4055 barsconcentration: +49.21% of the profit sits in the top 5% of trades — with the dates shuffled, +36.64% (fails above +50.00%)
  • costsgross +0.004% · cost 0.008% · net -0.004% (t=-0.08)
  • placeboactual -0.004% · placebo -0.008% · excess +0.004% ± 0.051% (t=0.07 against a threshold of 1.97, 270 real groups, 35,500 sham dates, draw error ±0.005%) — the status flips inside the placebo's own Monte Carlo error
  • benchmarktechnique -0.00% · buy and hold (same horizon) +0.00% · excess -0.01%
  • out of sampleasset half A: -0.001% (t=-0.02, 216 episodes) · asset half B: -0.007% (t=-0.13, 212 episodes) · liquid half (>= US$ 0/day): -0.004% (t=-0.08, 270 episodes) · period 1/4 (2020-01-02 a 2021-08-13): +0.054% (t=0.51, 70 episodes) · period 2/4 (2021-08-16 a 2023-04-02): -0.010% (t=-0.08, 70 episodes) · period 3/4 (2023-04-03 a 2025-01-15): +0.021% (t=0.24, 71 episodes) · period 4/4 (2025-01-16 a 2026-06-14): -0.082% (t=-1.07, 61 episodes)
  • multiple testing1 variation(s) tested · t=-0.08 across 270 episodes (equivalent to t=-0.08) · p≈0.9367 · false positives expected by chance ≈ 0.94

Equity — outside the six controls, and here is why

The t of the trade series is invariant to bet size: 0.5%, 1% and 3% agree to the sixth decimal. Nothing here moves the verdict — it moves what the account would have lived through.

risking 1.0% per trade
×1.00
worst drawdown from the peak
0%
days below the previous peak
2,138
signals refused for lack of capital
0%
paths where the account halved (out of 12)
0

Reproducibility

period
2020-01-01 to 2026-06-26
assets that traded
2
variations tested before this one
1
gross per trade
+0.00%
net per trade
−0.00%
exit rule
the technique itself (held until the opposite signal)
median duration bars
3
mean duration bars
5.7
max duration bars
44
spread pips
1.0
episode days
7
seed
20260728
McGinley period
10
McGinley k
0.6

Twelve Data forex (15m aggregated to 1d) · collected on 2026-07-25 · 2 assets · 4,055 bars · 2020-01-01 to 2026-06-26

Hypothesis, filed before the result

A legible formula but with the source text degraded in transcription, and the chapter gives NO signal rule at all — it is an indicator without a claim. It will be measured by the direction of the line, by analogy with the rest of the chapter, and that goes declared as THE AUDITOR's choice, not McGinley's. Family prediction, filed before measuring: (1) none of the adaptive averages survives the family's Benjamini-Hochberg in crypto; (2) the control that kills the most will be COST, not the benchmark — unlike the chart-pattern census, where the benchmark was the gravedigger, because these are always-in-the-market systems and they turn over a lot; (3) each adaptive average will have HIGHER turnover than its fixed-period counterpart already in the archive, and will die more at cost than it does. The mechanism is in the source itself: Table 17.1 reports a profit factor 'even before costs' and states that success is 'inversely related to the average number of trades' (KAMA 159 trades, factor 1.53; VIDYA 443, factor 1.17). That is a cost story told as a quality story. If I am wrong and one survives cost with higher turnover, the chapter's thesis gains evidence it did not present. MEASURED IN FOREX (EUR/USD and GBP/USD, daily bars built from 15m), not in crypto. This is a pre-registered REPLICATION of the same technique in the second market — not a new discovery — and the multiple-testing count treats it as such. What changes relative to the crypto card: 2 pairs over 6.5 years against 540 over 9, a round trip costs about 20× less (a 1 pip spread crossed once, against 0.1% commission per leg), the detection floor is about 10× lower (0.092% against 0.97%) and there is NO survivorship bias, because a currency pair does not get delisted. Specific prediction: with only 2 assets, the independent episodes come from TIME and not from the variety of assets, so I expect a low effective N and a high proportion of INCONCLUSIVE — and whatever is asserted here is worth more than in crypto, because cost cannot be the gravedigger.

filed on 2026-07-31, before the number existed

The original, as it was filed

Fórmula legível mas com o texto-fonte degradado na transcrição, e o capítulo NÃO dá regra de sinal nenhuma — é indicador sem alegação. Será medida pela direção da linha, por analogia com o resto do capítulo, e isso vai declarado como escolha DO AUDITOR, não de McGinley. Previsão da família, registrada antes de medir: (1) nenhuma das adaptativas sobrevive ao Benjamini-Hochberg da família em cripto; (2) o controle que mais mata será o CUSTO, e não o benchmark — diferente do censo de padrões gráficos, onde o benchmark foi o coveiro, porque estas são sistemas sempre-no-mercado e giram muito; (3) cada adaptativa terá giro MAIOR que a sua contraparte de período fixo já no corpus, e morrerá mais no custo do que ela. O mecanismo está na própria fonte: a Tabela 17.1 relata fator de lucro 'even before costs' e afirma que o sucesso é 'inversely related to the average number of trades' (KAMA 159 operações, fator 1,53; VIDYA 443, fator 1,17). Isso é uma história de custo contada como história de qualidade. Se eu estiver errado e alguma sobreviver ao custo com giro maior, a tese do capítulo ganha uma evidência que ele não apresentou. ⚠️ MEDIDO EM FOREX (EUR/USD e GBP/USD, diário agregado de 15m), e não em cripto. Isto é uma REPLICAÇÃO pré-registrada da mesma técnica no segundo mercado — não uma descoberta nova —, e a conta de múltiplos testes a trata como tal. O que muda em relação ao card de cripto: são 2 pares em 6,5 anos contra 540 em 9, o custo do giro é ~20× menor (spread de 1 pip cruzado uma vez, contra comissão de 0,1% por lado), o piso de detecção é ~10× menor (0,092% contra 0,97%) e NÃO há viés de sobrevivência, porque par de moeda não é deslistado. Previsão específica: com apenas 2 ativos, os episódios independentes vêm do TEMPO e não da variedade de ativos, então espero N efetivo baixo e uma proporção alta de INCONCLUSIVO — e o que for afirmado aqui vale mais que em cripto, porque o custo não tem como ser o coveiro.

Pre-registration exists to keep prediction apart from rationalisation: written after the number, every hypothesis is right.

Earlier audits of the same technique

Each variation an author teaches enters as its own test, so that whatever might work in the strategy gets covered. The verdict held in all of them.

  1. 2026-08-03FAILEDopen ↗
  2. 2026-08-03FAILEDopen ↗
  3. this measurement →FAILED
  4. 2026-07-31FAILEDopen ↗
  5. 2026-07-31FAILEDopen ↗

record bed2fa073563 · 2026-07-31 15:56

This code comes from this card's content: if anything here changed after publishing, the code would stop matching — that's how a change gets caught. We audit the technique, never the person — no record names an author, a channel or a brand.

The full record behind this verdict.